I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment begins with two references to the relationship between government and religion. 1 The prohibition on establishment of religion and the guarantee of free exercise of religion, despite their obvious interaction, are generally regarded as separate clauses, and analyzed under tests developed under one or the other. 2 The current state of Establishment Clause doctrine and Free Exercise doctrine is sharply contested and by no means clear.
Supreme Court justices will usually classify a religious freedom case as either presenting non-establishment or free exercise issues. Having done so, they will apply the test framed for that clause. But does that lead to the best and most defensible outcome? Might it be better to recognize that what we regard as separate clauses are, rather obviously, two aspects of a single right of religious freedom, and apply a single test that explicitly considers both values?
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the closest analog in the Canadian Constitution to the American Bill of Rights, makes no reference to a non-and the way many justices insist on privileging one clause over the other, even to the extent of dismissing the other as insignificant in the case. Part II will examine the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Town of Greece 6 and contrast it with the contemporaneous Supreme Court of Canada decision in City of Sanguenay.
7
Each case presented a similar question of the permissibility of local government bodies opening their sessions with public prayer. The cases reach sharply different conclusions, with Canada weighing non-establishment values more strongly without an express Establishment Clause than the Supreme Court of the United States. Part III will give a very brief history of how each constitutional system developed its own approach to the relationship between government and religion. Finally, Part IV will suggest a single test for religious freedom cases, whether they initially seem to invoke one or both currently separate clauses. This test will largely track the proportionality test used by Canadian (and other western) courts in individual rights cases. number of financial grants to nonprofit organizations to cover the expense of resurfacing playgrounds using a surface made from recycled tires, thought to be safer than gravel or comparable surfaces. 9 Trinity Lutheran operates a daycare center for preschool children ages two to five, on church property. 10 The Center admits children of any religion.
11
The Church's application for a grant under the recycled tire program scored quite high on several criteria unrelated to the religious nature of the Church, but Missouri denied the application based on a provision of the Missouri State Constitution.
The Missouri provision, and those like it in other states, were a reaction to intense controversy in many states during the mid and late nineteenth century over the role of religion in schools, public and private. 15 In a legal world that had not yet incorporated the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, states were free to consider their own responses to two questions: what role, if any, should religion play in public education, and what role, if any, should government play in support of religious alternatives to public education? 9 Id. at 2018. 10 Id. at 2017. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 2018; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 13 See STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND STATE IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 290-311 (2010), for a discussion of these "Blaine Amendments." 14 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2018; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 15 See GREEN, supra note 13. Congressman James Blaine, hoping to become the Republican nominee for president in 1876, introduced a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would address these questions. 16 The Blaine Amendment would clearly prohibit states from giving financial aid to religious schools, and would also require states to provide a system of public schools for all children. 17 Blaine seemed to lose interest in his proposal after he lost the nomination to Rutherford Hayes, and it never emerged from Congress. 18 A large number of states, however, including Missouri, enacted "Baby Blaine" amendments to their own constitutions, prohibiting state aid to religious schools in strong and specific language. 19 In Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court seemed to recognize the power of state constitutional provisions advancing non-establishment principles to a degree beyond the limits of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. 20 Washington, for example, administered a program of scholarship grants to high school graduates who met certain academic standards for use at public or private collages. 21 This program, would not, however, help fund a college-level program of study that prepared a student for ministry. 22 Davey, an otherwise qualified student, was denied a grant due to his desire to use it to help pay for such a program. 23 He brought suit claiming this constituted discrimination in violation of his free exercise rights. 24 A divided Court rejected his claim. 25 The Court held there was some "play in the joints" of establishment and free exercise principles allowing states to pursue nonestablishment values in somewhat stronger terms than required by the First Amendment. 26 16 Id. at 299. 17 Id. at 294-95. 18 Id. at 296-301. 19 Id. at 302. 20 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) . 21 Id. at 716. 22 Id. 23 Id. at 717-18. 24 Id. Is Locke still good law? Perhaps; the majority opinion did distinguish Locke as involving a program that did not distinguish on the grounds of who the recipient was, but rather on what the specific funds were to be used for. 32 It also dropped a short footnote, which was disavowed by two concurring Justices, 33 pointing out that the holding was limited to the specific facts of the case.
34
Four Justices, two concurring and two dissenting, would view the case as being, at least potentially, far more than a simple, fact-based decision about playground surfaces.
35
To dissenting Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsberg, the Court's decision was a serious blow to the principles behind the Establishment Clause. In the dissenters' view, the case was primarily about non-establishment values, and a serious erosion of those values. 39 In sharp contrast, the concurring opinions of Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch would prefer a stronger statement in favor of the Church's free exercise rights and dismissing any establishment concerns. 40 In particular, they specifically took issue with the majority's short footnote stressing the narrow scope of the Court's holding. 41 Finally, Justice Breyer, in a short concurring opinion, stressed the general public benefits of the scrap tire program, and added his own assertion that the case should be limited to its facts, leaving "the application of the Free Exercise Clause to other public benefits for another day." is clearly aware of the significance of each clause, and unwilling to give one automatic preference over the other.
Trinity Lutheran, like Locke, presents a situation where the co-existence of free exercise and Establishment Clause values is obvious. But the history of Religion Clause jurisprudence is dominated by cases placed, by the Court and commentators, 37 Id. 38 Id. at 2028 ("Constitutional questions are decided by this Court, not the parties' concessions."). 39 Id. at 2027. 40 Id. at 2025-26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 41 Id. 42 Id. at 2027 (Breyer, J., concurring). Neither of the Canadian documents has an express equivalent of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. Perhaps, then, the fact that cases came to different conclusions about local legislative prayer would not be surprising; but perhaps the way in which the courts disagreed might be.
A. Town of Greece v. Galloway
The town board of Greece, New York held a monthly meeting to conduct business. 47 Citizens could attend and address the members.
48
Until 1999, the board opened its meetings with a moment of silence.
49
The newly-elected board supervisor, in 1999, decided to begin meetings with a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer delivered by a local clergyman designated "chaplain of the month." claiming the practice of prayer violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause; the plaintiffs did not ask for a complete ban on such prayer, but only that prayer be limited to "inclusive and ecumenical" prayer.
52
As the case progressed, the town invited a Jewish layman and the chairman of a local Bahai temple to deliver an invocation and granted the application of a Wiccan priestess to do the same, 53 but the overwhelming majority of invocations were delivered by Christian clergy. The limited outreach seemed to make little difference to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which invalidated the practice, applying Justice O'Connor's "non-endorsement" approach to Establishment Clause cases, 54 and finding that a "steady drumbeat of Christian prayer" clearly sent a message of government endorsement of Christianity.
55
The Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Kennedy, reversed, largely on the basis of Marsh v. Chambers, the 1983 case permitting the Nebraska legislature's practice of having a chaplain open sessions with an invocation.
56
Marsh itself relied not on any previously-articulated Establishment Clause test, but rather on the longstanding nature of the practice of legislative invocations, dating back to the First Congress.
57
Justice Kennedy, again relying on Marsh and history, rejected the contention that legislative prayer must be nonsectarian because only a "course or practice over time" of prayers that "denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, or preach conversion" might be problematic.
58
Justice Kagan and her dissenting colleagues did not challenge Marsh itself, but distinguished it.
59
Local town board meetings include ordinary citizens as 52 Id. at 1817. 53 Id. The board itself, in dealing with citizen petitions and requests, is acting much as a court would act; surely a court session could not begin with sectarian prayer without making nonbelievers feel alienated from their government. 61 Thus, argued the dissent, local legislative prayer should be permissible not only where representatives of non-majority faiths have access to the "chaplain" role, but also where the prayers themselves are nonsectarian and inclusive. At the start of each public meeting of the Saguenay City Council, the mayor would deliver a prayer. 64 The short body of the prayer made no specific sectarian references, but the prayer began with the words (in French) "[i]n the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit," as the mayor made the sign of the cross. 65 An atheist resident of Sanguenay requested the mayor cease the practice, but the mayor refused.
66
The resident complained to the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal, which held the prayer practice was inconsistent with the Quebec Charter of Rights, in so far as it interfered with the resident's freedom of conscience and religion. 67 The case made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada, which, in sharp contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court in Town of Greece, unanimously held that the prayer practice, by "consciously adhering to certain religious beliefs to the exclusion of others," violated "the state's duty of neutrality" in derogation of the freedom of conscience and religion provisions of the Quebec Charter and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom.
68
In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, neither the Quebec nor 60 Id. at 1844-45. 61 Id. 62 Id. at 1850. 63 Mouvement Laïque Québécois v. Saguenay, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.). 64 Id. ¶ ¶ 1-4. 65 Id. 66 Id. 67 Id. ¶ ¶ 14-17. 68 Id. ¶ 4. the Canadian Charters contain an express provision calling for government neutrality on religious matters analogous to the First Amendment Establishment Clause. However, Justice Gascon, writing for the Canadian Court, held that such a duty "results from an evolving interpretation of freedom of conscience and religion," which "requires that the state neither favour nor hinder any particular belief, and the same holds true for non-belief." 69 The mayor and council members argued the prayers were protected as furthering their own rights of religious expression. 
73
But unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in Town of Greece, the Canadian court found a substantial difference between the national legislative body and local councils. In language reminiscent of Justice Kagan's Town of Greece dissent, Justice Gascon noted that at the local level, citizens are at least potential, if not actual, participants, which makes the messages of non-inclusion sent by the legislative body more significant.
74
Town of Greece and City of Saguenay presented remarkably similar factual situations to their respective courts. That different national high courts would reach sharply different conclusions is not, by itself, surprising. The contrast here stands out when we note that the constitutional documents suggest disagreement in the opposite direction. 75 How is it that the principle of non-establishment would receive stronger protection under the document that does not single out establishment as a particular concern? And these cases are not unique. Over the last three decades, Canadian 69 Id. ¶ ¶ 14-17. 70 Id. ¶ 73. 71 Id. 72 Id. ¶ 78. 73 Id. ¶ ¶ 141-43. 74 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1844-45 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 75 The Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11, § 2, sch. B (U.K.); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
76
How much does the constitutional text matter here? How might the text be molded by history or culture? Can the text (and even the punctuation) lead us down the wrong interpretive road? We might benefit from a brief look at the similarities and differences between United States and Canadian approaches to the proper interaction between religion and government.
IV. ESTABLISHMENT AND NON-ESTABLISHMENT IN TWO NATIONS: SOME BACKGROUND
A brief discussion of the origins of the respective religion provisions of the First Amendment and of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms will help to inform one's understanding of the provisions themselves.
A. Non-Establishment in the United States: A New Thing?
The principle that the U.S. Constitution calls for a separation of church and state, whatever the definition of separation might be, is so commonly acknowledged it is easy to overlook the degree to which that was a relatively new idea in the eighteenth century, and the degree to which the extent of separation was contested well into the twentieth century. European nations in the eighteenth century regarded it as a truism that a nation would benefit from, if not require, a nationally-recognized religion as a bulwark of national unity.
77
The degree to which dissenters would be tolerated might vary, but the basic principle remained. Incorporating the nonestablishment principle into a constitutional document was, at best, a highly unusual thing.
78
The Vatican must have been quite surprised when its request to the Washington administration for advice on the appointment of an American bishop was rejected with the explanation that the new government had no role in religious matters.
79
It is hardly surprising, then, such a new idea would need explicit 76 See infra notes 139-56 and accompanying text. 77 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 422 (1651) (writing approvingly of the proposition that "in every Christian Common-wealth, the Civil Sovereign is the Supreme Pastor . . . it is by his authority that all other Pastors are made, and have power to teach"). 78 See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 13, at 24-31 (discussing the variations in the establishments in the American colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). The second important point to remember is that the First Amendment, and the balance of the Bill of Rights, was a limitation only on the federal government until the enactment of the Civil War Amendments. 80 The incorporation of the guarantee into the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on denial of due process by the states occurred later. 84 See GREEN, supra note 13, at 118-45. 85 Id. 86 Id. at 144 ("Formal establishments by the early antebellum era were already anachronisms."). See id. at 145, for a discussion of the end of the final formal establishments. 87 Id. This was likely inevitable in light of two important developments in the early to mid-century: the rise of the public school, that is, basic schooling provided by the state and open to all children, and the first great waves of immigration, most prominently in the same era, by Catholic Irish newcomers. 90 Whether a consequence of actual theological differences, a reaction to the Vatican's rejection of the principle of separation of church and state, or simple ethnic prejudice, the presence of Irish Catholics in large numbers would trigger significant conflict, largely political, and occasionally violent. 91 Irish immigration coincided with the emergence and swift growth of the public "common" school, largely the work of Horace Mann.
92
Education had been the province of private entities, often associated with religious institutions, and sometimes benefiting from public financial support.
93
It was a nearly universal belief that some form of religious instruction would be a part of basic education. 94 While religious institutions provided basic education, this created no particular problem. But if all children were to be gathered together in a publicly-operated school, how would religion be incorporated, if at all?
The new public schools widely adopted Bible reading and other religious practices Catholic leaders saw as explicitly Protestant. 95 This led to demands that these practices be ended, or that public funds be made available to Catholic schools, which took root and grew as the century progressed.
96
Funding for Catholic or other religious private schools was rejected, with many states enacting the specific language of "Baby Blaine" amendments, similar to the amendment that had died in 88 Id. at 251-325. 89 
Id.
90 See generally id. at 253-71. 91 Id. at 266-71. 92 Id. at 251-66. 93 Id. at 252 ("At the beginning of the century, public education was unapologetically religious in orientation."). 94 Id. at 253-54. 95 Id. at 266-71. With respect to religion in public schools, the most common early response was that as long as the Bible and other religious references were "nonsectarian," thought of as sort of a least common denominator Protestantism, no one could validly object. 98 Toward the end of the century, however, school districts began to take objections to the "nonsectarian" position seriously, and moved toward secularizing public schools. 99 But prayer and Bible reading would persist in many districts until the Supreme Court would find, in the 1960s, that these practices violated the Establishment Clause. 
In 1963, the Court declared that an unemployment compensation applicant who was denied benefits was entitled to have her religiously-motivated refusal to accept Saturday work recognized as a Free Exercise-based exemption.
110
The Court held that an exemption claim based on a statute's substantial interference with religious duty required the state to justify denial of the exemption under the strict scrutiny standard.
111
But the 1970s and 1980s saw the Free Exercise version of strict scrutiny applied in a manner that hardly resembled its near per se invalidity standard in other 107 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion has coercion of religious orthodoxy and financial support by force of law and threat of penalty."). Only a government statute or practice that singled out believers due to hostility to their beliefs rather than the secular consequences of their actions, would call for application of anything more than a rational basis justification.
115
While Smith seemed to not only significantly reduce the scope of the Free Exercise Clause, but also to clarify the proper standard, subsequent events in the political branches of both the federal and state levels of government intervened to make the situation much murkier.
116
By statute, Congress created a strict scrutiny standard for a religiously-based claim of exemption from federal mandates; and a significant number of states, either by statute or court decision, affirmed strict scrutiny was the appropriate test when judging a claim to a free exercise exemption under state constitutional or statutory law. 117 So, in recent decades, the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment have led to the following situation: a once rather rigorous Establishment Clause has become significantly less restrictive on government activity that benefits religion. At the level of First Amendment doctrine, Smith has had a similar narrowing effect on the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. But subsequent events in Congress, and at the state level, have pushed back, and the actual scope of free exercise protection may not be much less than that afforded in pre-Smith times. There seems to be little question that states are free to give greater free exercise protection than that provided by the First Amendment. But Trinity Lutheran casts doubt on the extent to which states are also free to expand their 112 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1983) (holding no exception from military uniform requirements to permit Orthodox Jewish army psychiatrist to wear a yarmulke); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (holding no exemption for religious group from state fair regulation that sale or distribution of literature must be from fixed booths). Has all of this left us with a legal regime that underenforces non-establishment values? And might the separate evolution of the two religion clauses have contributed to this?
B. Religious Freedom in Canadian Constitutional Law: Some Background
Canadian law concerning church and state would develop from a starting point with significant differences from that of the United States. At the time of Confederation, Canada inherited the British doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, and it would be many decades before Canadian courts would be asked to invalidate legislation as interfering with religious freedom. 119 And neither the British nor French legacy would lead Canadians to regard government recognition and assistance to religion as unusual or very troubling.
If the North-South divide was the source of greatest tension in the forging of the U.S. Constitution, the British-French divide was the greatest threat to Canadian unity in the nineteenth century and continued to be a source of conflict thereafter.
120
In recent decades, the conflict has focused on language rights, but prior to the 1960s, the British-French divide was played out on religious grounds, as a ProtestantCatholic conflict. 121 As the unrest that would engulf the American colonies in Revolution percolated, the British Parliament, in the Quebec Act of 1774, provided that the inhabitants of Quebec would "have the free Exercise of the Religion of the Church of Rome, subject to the king's supremacy," a concession credited with maintaining Quebec's loyalty during the American Revolution.
122
The 1851 Freedom of Worship Act sought to protect "the free exercise and enjoyment of Religious Profession and Worship without discrimination or preference," but discrimination against Catholics in pre-Confederation provinces outside Quebec continued. The British North America Act of 1867, the document that served as the original constitution of a united Canada (consisting at the time of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick), dealt with the religious issue by dividing national and provincial powers. 124 Each province, for example, was allowed to determine the acceptable form of marriage, while the nation would maintain a single federal definition of marriage.
125
Of more lasting significance, each province was given exclusive control over education.
126
Prior to 1867, both Quebec and Ontario had established public schools that included instruction in the dominant provincial religion, but also provided public support for dissenters to have their own religiouslybased schools (Protestant in Quebec and Catholic in Ontario).
127
Article 93 of the 1867 Constitution preserved each province's right to continue the system in place at the time of confederation.
128
Statutes enacted in later decades would provide the same powers to provinces that joined the confederation after 1867.
129
In short, the constitutional system allowed provinces to choose to maintain publicly-funded schools for Catholic or Protestant minorities in a province where the dominant public school system was unacceptable to that group, as long as those schools were in place at the time the province joined the Confederation. In recent decades, provinces have moved away from this system of allowing public funds to confessional schools of Catholic or Protestant faiths (but not other minority religions), yet the authority of the provinces to provide funding for dissenting Protestant or Catholic schools remains. 130 The tradition of Parliamentary Supremacy meant that until the 1982 constitutional reforms that gave birth to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, religious freedom was entirely a matter for statutory, if any, protection.
131
But the Charter, in Section 2, provides constitutional protection of "freedom of conscience 124 
V. FREE EXERCISE AND NON-ESTABLISHMENT: TWO VALUES OR ONE?
In the previous section, we saw two nations with somewhat different histories and legal responses to the issue of religious freedom. In the United States, an early decision was made to reject the notion of an established church, at least at the national level. 134 This was reflected in the early inclusion of a non-establishment provision in its Constitution, and the prohibition would be extended decades later to action by state governments. 135 In Canada, certain elements of establishment were accepted in its original constitutional arrangement, and while current constitutional language expressly protects religious freedom, there is no express prohibition of establishment.
136
One would logically predict that the United States would take the non-establishment principle far more seriously than Canada. Yet, since the enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canadian courts have seemed to be at least as diligent in enforcement of the principle as their American counterparts. In Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a proportionality test for the application of Section 1. In short, the test asks three things of the challenged statute: whether it is rationally related to a legitimate government objective, whether it impairs the right as little as possible, and whether the government interest is sufficiently important to justify the degree of interference with the right.
144
Under this test, the Court found the more narrowly-tailored Ontario statute was justified. where the Court upheld a Sunday closing statute, accepting the state's justification that it had been adopted for the secular purpose of providing for a common day of rest and the choice of Sunday was merely in recognition of the preferences of most citizens.
147
The decision, which pre-dated the emergence of the Lemon test or its elements present in the school prayer cases, focused on the claim 139 Big M Drug Mart, [1985] Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the United States was largely formed by the cases invaliding prayer and devotional Bible reading in public schools, and the two-part purpose and effect test that would be expanded to the three-part Lemon test.
149
But the absence of an express non-establishment principle in Canada did not prevent several provincial courts from striking down similar practices in post-Charter public schools.
As discussed above, the 1867 Constitution included Article 93, which protected minority religious education insofar as it existed at the time of Confederation (or, by statute, at the time new provinces joined), but it did not speak to the question of religion in the majority schools.
150
The presence of religion in the public schools, Protestant in most provinces, Catholic in Quebec, was unchallenged for decades.
151
Starting in the 1960s, however, sentiment in several provinces in favor of secularization of public schools grew, and in the aftermath of the adoption of the Charter provision guaranteeing freedom of religion, challenges were brought to the practice of prayer in public schools. Even if exemptions were allowed for particular students, the Court held, this infringed the religious freedom of religious minorities.
155
The British Columbia Supreme Court and the Manitoba Court of Appeal would, within a few years of Zylberberg, rely on similar reasoning to prohibit mandatory religious exercises in those provinces. These cases, along with City of Saguenay, discussed supra, show that an express non-establishment provision within a constitution is not necessary for a court to recognize and enforce the values underlying non-establishment principles.
157
Canadian courts, under the banner of freedom of religion, have come to conclusions in cases that would be recognized as Establishment Clause cases in the United States that are similar, and in some cases, more diligent in their protection of nonestablishment principles.
158
A separate Establishment Clause might, in a subtle way, be not only unnecessary to protect non-establishment values, but might actually hinder the enforcement of these values, by masking their connection to free exercise.
VI. A SINGLE PROPORTIONALITY TEST FOR THE RELIGION CLAUSES?
In an eighteenth-century world where government favoritism toward a particular religion was common, the framers of the First Amendment would see the need for specific non-establishment language. Standing alone, a free exercise guarantee might promise no more than mere tolerance of dissenters. Even today, and even in Western democracies, the demand that government be absolutely neutral in religious matters is not universal. Post-World War II international covenants on human rights typically protect freedom of religion and conscience, but do not contain provisions prohibiting government support of favored religions.
159 National constitutions range from those proclaiming the nation to be secular, to those recognizing a special place in the history and culture of the nation for one religion, to those maintaining, at least symbolically, a national church. 160 The Canadian cases illustrate that the absence of an explicit non-establishment provision does not preclude courts from recognizing non-establishment principles as inherent in a guarantee of religious freedom. The question, of course, will not be whether respect for the principle is present or absent, but rather how strongly it weighs in the balance. One might assume the presence of a non-establishment provision would ensure the most rigorous enforcement of the principle. Yet the level of Establishment Clause enforcement in the United States has noticeably declined. 161 However counterintuitive it might seem, could the impulse to regard nonestablishment and free exercise as separate principles, even though related, be in part responsible for underenforcement?
The treatment of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses as separate things has led to the development of separate analytical tests for each. And within each clause, debate continues about the proper test. Establishment Clause cases pit advocates of non-coercion, non-endorsement, and strict Lemon separation against each other.
162
Free Exercise cases see advocates of strict scrutiny contend with supporters of only minimal scrutiny in most cases. 163 And all of this usually means that when confronted with a church-state case, the first thing one is led to do is to choose which box to place it in: Free Exercise or Establishment?
Of course, separate analytical tracks have not prevented judges from recognizing connections. In United States v. Welsh, a statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional case, 164 Justice Harlan concurred in an opinion defining the term "religious" in a statute allowing conscientious objectors to avoid the military draft in an extremely broad way, because he thought a narrow, traditional definition would cause some Establishment Clause problems. 165 And the Establishment Clause cases dealing with school prayer are argued with the impact on the students' own religious rights obvious in the background. 166 Nevertheless, the choice of how to classify a case, and what test follows from that decision, can skew the process. The Establishment Clause tests focus on whether government has overstepped its bounds 161 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. 162 
Id.
163 See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text. 164 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1979). 165 Id. at 356-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). Conversely, the Free Exercise Clause bring the individual into the foreground but pushes the duty of government to maintain neutrality on religious questions into the background. 168 If the separate analytical approaches to cases labelled as either Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause cases can lead to less than optimal outcomes, what can be done to improve the situation? If both clauses were rethought as simply aspects of a single clause protecting freedom of religion, what alternative analytical framework might be appropriate? The Canadian approach offers a possible answer.
169
The Oakes test for balancing Charter rights claims under the Section 1 provision asks when the limitation of the right is consistent with "reasonable limits . . . demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
170
The Oakes test is a version of the "proportionality" test adopted by a number of Western democracies to consider limitations of recognized individual rights.
171
While subtle differences exist in the application of this proportionality test among nations that adhere to it, the basic steps are the same. And while the U.S. Supreme Court has largely resisted the use of proportionality in individual rights cases, an examination of the test will show it brings together a number of analytical steps quite familiar to American lawyers.
The initial step will be to determine whether there is a plausible claim of a rights violation at the outset, before any type of balancing or enunciation of the state's interest is considered. . 172 The right of free speech has been broadly defined. See, e.g., Irwin Toy, 1 S.C.R at 969 ("if the activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and prima facie falls within the scope of the guarantee"). Since this is merely a threshold question, not clearly leading to strong or weak protection, the consequences of clarifying a belief system as "religion" or not becomes less crucial. Of course, Canadian Charter language speaking in terms of religion and conscience lends itself to broad interpretation, but the absence of the term "conscience" from the First Amendment does not by any means limit American courts to a narrow definition of the belief systems protected.
174
In a system recognizing a single freedom of religion right, the plausible violation here may be twofold.
175
The government action may have implications for both non-establishment and free exercise values, and both may be necessary to consider regardless of the particular objections to government activity put forward by the particular plaintiff.
176
The next step in proportionality analysis is to identify the government interest in the action that is challenged.
177
The Oakes court held that the interest must be "pressing and substantial," and while this certainly sounds like a level of heightened, if not strict, scrutiny, courts can be reluctant to end the analysis here if the government interest is not clearly illegitimate or trivial.
178
The strength or weakness of the government interest will return as a factor in the final step of analysis.
With the state interest in its regulation established, the next step is to ask whether there is a rational connection between the regulation and the objective.
179
Similar to the rational basis test in American constitutional law, this part of the test will usually be satisfied and will exclude only actions entirely unrelated to legitimate government goals.
180
In the context of religious freedom, it would end the inquiry in favor of the rights claimant only where the legitimate interest put forward by the state seems entirely pretextual, and invoked to justify either naked hostility or favoritism to religion. The next step is to ask whether the state action impairs the right as little as possible, or in terms more familiar to American lawyers, whether there is an alternative which would satisfy the state interest while imposing less of a burden on the right.
182
While this step sounds like the strict scrutiny test, in systems employing proportionality it will not be interpreted as rigorously. In order for the inquiry to end here, it must be shown an alternative exists that is obvious and practical, and that will allow the government objective to be satisfied to the full extent that it is satisfied by the challenged practice. 183 At this stage of the analysis, the state need not accept an alternative that would be less effective or costlier. But such matters will be appropriate to consider in the final step of the proportionality analysis.
The final step of proportionality analysis is to weigh whether "all things considered, the objective is sufficiently important to justify the extent of the infringement." 184 This is the step where proportionality truly becomes a balancing test. And, like all balancing tests, it is open to the criticism that it is hopelessly indeterminate, and merely a matter of subjective weighing of value by the decisionmaker. In the arena of religious freedom, do we value non-establishment more or less than free exercise? Aharon Barak, in his survey of proportionality across a number of legal systems, insists that a more precise balancing inquiry can at least minimize the subjectivity problem. [T]he necessity test does not require the use of means whose limitation is the smallest, or even of a lesser extent as the means chosen by the law, if the means cannot achieve the proper purpose to the same extent as the means chosen by the law. This necessity test does not require a minimal limitation of this constitutional right; it only requires the smallest limitation required to achieve the law's purpose.
Id. at 321. 183 See id. at 350-62. 184 Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 S.C.R at 994.
185
[T]he issue is not the comparison of the general social importance of the purpose (security, public safety, etc.) on the one hand and the general social importance of preventing harm to the constitutional right (equality, freedom of expression, etc.) on the other. Rather, the issue is much more limited. It refers to the comparison between the state of the purpose prior to the law's enactment, compared with that state afterwards, and the state of the constitutional right prior to the law's enactment compared with its state after enactment. Accordingly, we are comparing the marginal social importance of the benefit gained by the limiting law and the marginal social importance of interest involved in the abstract, the proper question is whether the marginal benefits of the state regulation in question outweigh the marginal infringement on the right.
186
This will, of course, require an assessment of the importance of the right and the countervailing interest at the abstract level, but will not always lead to a conclusion in favor of one or the other. Some will object to a balancing test that allows an interest to ever prevail against a right. But in the context of religious freedom, if nonestablishment and free exercise are seen as dual aspects of the right the balance will not, at least entirely, involve a right-interest conflict, but a balance between potentially conflicting aspects of a single right.
How would the application of this analysis look in practice? Would it necessarily lead to sharp changes in outcomes? Would it perhaps lead to more convincing reasoning in support of outcomes? As an example, we might return to Trinity Lutheran and examine it under the proportionality framework.
The threshold question is easily resolved. The Church's complaint that the exclusion of their application from consideration obviously presents a plausible freedom of religion issue.
187
The state then must come forward with an acceptable objective. While the objective of the grant program is to promote safety of playgrounds and the children who use them, the Church's objection is not to the program, but to the exclusion of their application. The state interest here will be itself an argument in favor of religious freedom under the non-establishment principle.
188
Given the long history of religious conflict associated with the issue of state financial support of churches, the state should have no trouble establishing a rational relation between its decision and its significant interest. There does not seem to be an alternative that would address the Church's claim yet fully satisfy the state's preventing the harm to the constitutional right caused by the limiting law. The question is whether the right of the marginal social importance of the benefits is heavier than the weight of the marginal social importance of preventing the harm. With the preliminary questions addressed, and none of them leading to a quick resolution, we come to the core of proportionality, the balancing process. Unlike many balancing tests, this one is more "apples-to-apples" than measuring two distinct interests.
190
Both the state and the Church are pursuing their own view of religious freedom. Is the marginal harm to the religious freedom of the Church to be free of discrimination greater or less than the marginal harm to the non-establishment principle that would arise from breaching the "no direct financial aid" rule?
Clearly, there will be disagreement on the proper resolution of the balancing test. But this indeterminacy is hardly different than the current state of religion clause jurisprudence. In fact, it is not far from the points raised by the Court's majority opinion in Trinity Lutheran.
191
While dismissing the Establishment Clause as not at issue, the opinion takes pains to stress it is limited to the facts presented, and also to point out that it does not overrule, but distinguishes Locke.
192
In other words, in a situation presenting roughly similar issues, Locke and Trinity Lutheran come out differently when the perceived burden on the non-establishment principle varies.
One significant question does remain concerning the future of Locke. And it will need to be resolved whether or not the religion clauses are considered as separate inquiries. Locke clearly indicated that states were free, to some extent, to strike the non-establishment/free exercise balance more strongly in favor of nonestablishment, under their state constitutions, than the Supreme Court would do under the First Amendment.
193
Trinity Lutheran did not clearly address this point. The Court distinguished Locke on its facts, 194 but did not explain why the Missouri State constitutional prohibition on state financial aid to churches did not protect the 189 The position that a right will always outweigh a general social interest is most closely identified with Ronald Dworkin. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-94 (1978) . 190 Justice Scalia is perhaps the foremost critic of balancing, contending that the attempt to balance incommensurate interests is "like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." Bendix Automotive Corp. v. Midwest Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). faith for meeting upon meeting, year after year, it is difficult to imagine constitutional limits to sectarian prayer practice. 207 Still, several judges dissented, claiming Judge Wilkerson was simply cherry-picking individual invocations to support his conclusion.
208
If the Rowan County situation is not problematic, does that mean that Town of Greece will essentially be read to mean legislative prayer is simply per se valid? And can that possibly be correct within a constitutional system that specifically warns against the establishment of religion?
VII. CONCLUSION: NON-ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE: EITHER/OR OR NOT ONLY/BUT ALSO?
Religion clause law is in a state of flux; perhaps even in something of a state of disarray.
209
Several approaches to the Establishment Clause contend for acceptance. While Smith seemed to simplify Free Exercise law, the legislative pushback (and developments at the state level) have revived the Sherbert test.
210
The separate opinions in Trinity Lutheran illustrate the continued tension between the current approaches to the two clauses.
211
Perhaps much of the confusion stems from the perceived need to initially classify a case as either a free exercise or a non-establishment problem. Having done so, a judge may have tipped the scales in a way that ignores the extent to which the other value is implicit in each. Canadian cases, working under a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that does not explicitly ban establishment, illustrate the implicit presence of each value in what American law would recognize as presenting one or the other value.
Recognizing a single right of religious freedom, one that incorporates both nonestablishment and free exercise values, may allow for a more careful analysis of these cases. A single proportionality test that recognizes that the claim of a free exercise exemption or grant of aid inevitably calls for consideration of non-establishment values, and that an Establishment Clause claim may impinge on free exercise, may or may not change many outcomes, but will honestly confront the dual issues. Even if American courts continue to resolve the balance as they currently do, the application of a single test to a single right of religious freedom serves to explain the 207 
Id.
208 See generally id. at 296-300 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); id. at 301-10 (Agee, J., dissenting). 209 See supra notes 77-120 and accompanying text. In short, religious freedom claims should not be seen as an "either/or" choice between non-establishment and free exercise values. Regardless of how the balance is ultimately struck, each case presents a "not only/but also" relation between the two aspects of what is actually a single right of religious freedom.
